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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

Case No. 950450-CA

JEREMY S. OLSEN,

:

Priority No. 2

v.

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a restitution order following convictions of burglary, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and theft, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1995), in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, Utah County, the Honorable Guy R. Bumingham presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did defendant waive his claim that the trial court did not consider all
relevant statutory criteria by failing to object below and failing to provide this
Court with a complete appellate record?

A defendant's failure to object to procedural defects waives any appellate
challenge to the procedure. £££ State v. Peterson. 841 P.2d 21, 24-25 (Utah App.
1992) (refusing to consider unpreserved claim that the trial court required insufficient
protective procedures in its wire tap order).
Moreover, a defendant's "failure to object to the enhancement of his sentence
absent adequate written findings precludes [the appellate court's] considering the issue
when raised for the first time on appeal." State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah
App. 1994) (citing State v. Bywater, 748 P.2d 568, 568 (Utah 1987)), cert, granted,
892P.2dl3(Utahl995). 1
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or find a fact against the clear
weight of the evidence by accepting the victim's calculation of his loss and rejecting
defendant's estimate?
"Unless a trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its
discretion, [this Court] will not disturb its order of restitution." State v. Twitchell, 832
P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted).
An appellate court will "reverse a trial court's findings of fact only if they are
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. In
making such a determination, [the court will] view the evidence in a light most
1

Labrum is currently under review in the Utah Supreme Court on this issue. The case was
argued and submitted on 4 October 1995.
2

favorable to the trial court's findings." State v. One 1984 Oldsmobile, 892 P.2d 1042,
1043 (Utah 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
"This standard is highly deferential to the trial court. . . The judge of that court is
. . . considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to
derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope
to garner from a cold record." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This appeal involves the following statute:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(8) (Supp. 1995).
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or
to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, that
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity,
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to
or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a
method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; the
cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.

3

(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for
court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in
Subsection (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations
of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution
inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of
restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to provide
restitution to the victim.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged on 23 February 1995 with burglary of a dwelling and theft
of property valued at over $1,000, both second degree felonies (R. 3). Defendant waived
a preliminary hearing and was bound over on both charges (R. 12). Defendant pled guilty
to reduced charges of burglary and theft of property valued between $250 and $1,000, both
third degree felonies (R. 23-25). He was referred to Adult Probation and Parole for a
Presentence Investigation Report (R. 23).
Defendant unsuccessfully moved the court to enter judgment, conviction, and sentence
under the next lower category of offense, class A misdemeanors (R. 22).
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After receiving and considering the presentence investigation report, the court sentenced
defendant to concurrent statutory sentences for the third degree felonies, together with a
fine of $500. However, the court suspended the sentence and placed defendant on probation
for 36 months (R. 26-27). After an evidentiary hearing, the court entered a restitution order
imposing restitution in the amount of $20,156.50 (R. 37-38).
Defendant timely appealed from the restitution order (R. 40).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Crime
On or about 13 December 1994, defendant and a minor broke into a 6 x 6 storage closet
in the garage of Richard Wright, a Springville brick mason (R. 18, 28, 50-51, 67). The
storage closet was designed as a walk-in cooler and protected by a two-inch steel door (R.
51). They also breached a five and one-half-inch steel door to gain access to money Wright
had been gradually stashing over 44 years (R. 50). Defendant and his co-perpetrator stuffed
the cash they found into backpacks (R. 108).
The Trial Court's Findings
Only Wright and defendant testified at the restitution hearing (R. 47). After hearing
their testimony and considering the State's exhibits {see R. 28-30, addendum B), the trial
court found "by credible evidence" that the State had established the following losses:

5

1. One broken window in the amount of

$306.00

2. Wallet with forty five $100.00 bills

4500.00

3. One bank bag of antique coins valued at

13,550.50

4. Money missing from the "money box*

16,400.00

5. Two #10 coffee cans with cash and change

800.00

(R. 36-37, addendum A). The court did not award restitution for two pistols, valued at
approximately $350 dollars each, or for rolled coins that had been stored in an "ammo box"
(R. 28, State's Ex. 1 [addendum B]; R. 37-38, addendum A).
The court found that "the victim in this case is entitled to total restitution in the amount
of $35,556.50, less the amount recovered of $15,400.00, for a total balance of $20,156.50,
still unpaid" (R. 37).
Richard Wright's Testimony.
Wright testified that he had been using this storage room to store money and guns for
twenty years, and saving cash for 44 years (R. 51-52). Although Wright did not keep a
detailed accounting, in 1988 he "counted roughly around $30,000 in cash, and about $1,000
in silver"; in 1989 he "counted it and [he] had $22,090 cash, plus the $1,000 silver" (R.
52). Since that time he continued to add to the cache in $500 or $1,000 amounts (R. 53).
Broken window. Wright testified that it cost $306 to repair a window broken as a
result of this burglary (R. 54).
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Wallet with 45 $100 bills. With the bills was a piece of paper telling how much was
there; the figure on the note was $4,500 (R. 55-56). Wright also calculated the value of
the currency by recalling the height of the stack of bills and estimating the number of bills
(R. 55). By this method, $4,500 was a "very low" estimate (R. 56).
Money box with $16,400. Wright put a note in this money box specifying the bills
he stored there: 40 $20 bills, 54 $50 bills, and 129 $100 bills (R. 58-59). Defendant and
his co-perpetrator left the note behind in the burglary (R. 58). (The trial court excluded
some rolled coins stored in an ammunition box that Wright estimated at $720 (R. 37-38,
addendum A; 56-57).)
Coffee cans with $800. Defendant stole two No. 10 coffee cans full of loose coins
and bills. Wright had been using the cans for 15 years and estimated the value of me money
at $1,000 (R. 57-58).
Antique coins worth $13,550.50. Wright had been collecting antique coins from his
days as a paper boy in 1941 (R. 61). Approximately 15 years before the burglary, Wright
moved the coins from his home to the storage room; after that time he did not touch them
(R. 62). Wright was able to list the missing coins with specificity (R. 29, State's Ex. 2
[addendum B], 63). For purposes of valuation, Wright relied on the estimates by a coin
dealer, who separately estimated each coin based on its denomination and year (R. 84-85).
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Recovery. Wright testified that the Sheriffs department recovered $15,400 and returned
it to him (R. 65, see also State's Ex. 3, addendum B).
Wright admitted mat it was "kind of hard to say really how much was taken"; however,
he thought the actual amount was higher than his estimate (R. 67).
Defendant's Testimony
Defendant admitted that he and his co-perpetrator broke Wright's window (R. 98).
He denied taking anythingfromthe ammunition box (R. 99). He admitted "removing items"
from the coffee cans, removing the bank bag of antique coins, and taking a wallet full of
$100 bills (R. 100, 109). Defendant claimed that he and his co-perpetrator did not count
the coins, but did count the "cash," which came to over $16,000 (R. 101). He said that
the police recovered $17,350 (R. 102). Defendant estimated Wright's loss at $1,500 to
$2,000 (R. 102).
Defendant admitted that his co-perpetrator's backpack was never recovered by the police,
that it contained the antique coins, and that when me police counted the money in his presence
there were no antique coins in the lot (R. 108-09, 112).
Defendant also admitted that his co-perpetrator surreptitiously took some of the money,
"almost $1,000 or over," he believed (R. 114-15). Defendant claimed that he himself did
not take any (R. 115).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Defendant's claim that the trial court failed to consider all relevant statutory factors
is doubly waived. First, defendant failed to object in the trial court on the grounds he now
asserts. And even though he testified in his own behalf, he failed to mention any of the
factors he now faults the court for not considering. Second, because the presentence report
and a transcription of the sentencing hearing are not included in the record on appeal, this
Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.
2. Defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the restitution
amount is in fact an attack on a finding of pure fact. It will therefore not be set aside absent
a showing that the court found against the clear weight of the evidence. It is the role of
trial, not appellate, courts to resolve credibility disputes. Here, the trial court believed the
victim's specific and detailed estimate of loss rather than defendant's vague and conclusory
one, as it was entided to do. The court's finding is supported by the weight of the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY FAILING TO CONTEMPORANEOUSLY OBJECT AND FAILING
TO COMPLETE THE APPELLATE RECORD, DEFENDANT HAS
WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT THE COURT DD3 NOT CONSIDER
ALL RELEVANT STATUTORY CRITERIA AND ENTER FINDINGS
On appeal, defendant first challenges the manner in which the trial court
determined to impose restitution. He asserts "mat there is no evidence that me trial
9

judge considered any of the 'legally relevant' factors enumerated in Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(4)(c)." Br. of Aplt. at 10. Consequently, he reasons, "this Court must vacate
the order of restitution and remand the case for reconsideration and supplementary
findings on the question of restitution." Id.
Due to an amendment, the statutory criteria on which defendant relies now appear
at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (8)(c) (Supp. 1995).2 This subsection plainly requires a
sentencing court, in "determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution," to consider (i) the financial resources of the defendant, (ii) the
defendant's ability to pay on an installment or other court-ordered arrangement; (iii) the
rehabilitative effect on the defendant; and (iv) other factors mitigating against
restitution. Subsection 201(4)(d)(i) provides that u[i]f the court determines that
restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make
the reasons for the decision a part of the court record."
Hence, "[w]hile the court has the discretion to award or deny restitution, the judge
must state the reasons for the decision in the trial record." State v. Haston, 811 P.2d

2

Effective 1 May 1995, these criteria were moved to subsection (8) of section 76-3-201
and supplemented with criteria focusing on the amount of the loss. See Utah Code Ann. § 763-201(8) (Supp. 1995), Amendment Notes. (A subsequent amendment, which becomes
effective 29 April 1996, does not affect this case.) The sentencing hearing, entry of Judgment
and Order of Probation, restitution hearing, and restitution award in this case all occurred after
1 May 1995 (see R. 23-24, 26-27, 31-33, 37-38). Therefore, defendant's claim is based on
subsection 76-3-201(8), not subsection 76-3-201(4). (The foil text of subsection 76-3-201(8) is
reproduced in the Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules portion of this brief.)
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929, 936 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds, 846 P.2d
1276 (Utah 1993).
A. This claim was not preserved in the trial court.
Here, defendant claims that a[t]his issue was preserved at a restitution hearing
conducted on June 8, 1995." Br. of Aplt. at 2. A restitution hearing was indeed held
on 8 June 1995 (R. 31). However, the only issue defendant ever addressed in the
hearing was the value of the money and coins stolen by defendant.
Thus, defense counsel argued that the estimates of value were "old at best"; that
"the value[sj of the coins are based on the phone conversation with somebody that we
don't have the name of who it is or how they would know what the values are"; and
that there was "not even an inventory list" of the contents of the money box (R. 117).
He concluded, "I think that the Court should look at the amount of items recovered and
what was reported to the police, and just go on that the best it can. I just don't know —
I don't think the State has proven this figure submitted at $36,976.50. I don't think
they can substantiate it all" (R. 119).
Defendant never mentioned below the issue he now presses on appeal, although he
had every opportunity to do so. Defendant testified at length (R. 98-116), but never
mentioned the statutory factors he now faults the trial court for not considering, even
though many of them were within his personal knowledge. He never claimed to lack

11

financial resources or the ability to pay restitution in installments or otherwise. Nor did
he deny the rehabilitative effect of restitution in his case or cite any other factor
mitigating against restitution. These omissions defeat defendant's claim under the
elementary rule requiring a litigant to enter a timely and specific objection on the
record to preserve an issue for appeal. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161
(Utah 1991).
In an analogous civil context, there is a list of seven factors that "must be
considered in assessing the amount of [punitive damages] to be awarded." Crookston
v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991) {citing Bundy v. Century
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,
771 (Utah 1985)). Nevertheless, a defendant who stands by while a punitive damage
claim is submitted to the jury without instruction on these factors may not challenge the
jury award for the first time on appeal on the ground that the jury failed to consider all
legally relevant factors. Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 769.
Defendant also failed to preserve his claim that the trial court failed to "ma[k]e its
reasons for its order of restitution part of the record.n Br. of Aplt. at 9. A defendant
who fails to object at sentencing may not on appeal challenge the trial court's failure to
enter statutorily required findings. State v. Bywater, 748 P.2d 568, 568-69 (Utah
1987); State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1994), cert, granted, 892 P.2d 13
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(Utah 1995).3 This rule furthers the judicial interest in giving trial courts the first
opportunity to correct their alleged errors. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161. It seeks to
avoid wasting scarce appellate resources to address on appeal what the trial court could
easily have corrected at the time with a proper objection.
B. The appellate record is incomplete.
Defendant asserts "that there is no evidence that the trial judge considered any of
the 'legally relevant' factors enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(c)." Br. of
Aplt. at 10. It is true that there is no such evidence in the appellate record; but the
appellate record in this case is incomplete.
The appellate record does not contain the presentence report. The trial court
referred defendant to Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence investigation report
(PSI), which report the court "received and considered" (R. 23, 26-27). The PSI made
a recommendation which likely included restitution. A thorough PSI may even have
examined the section 76-3-20l(4)(c) factors: defendant's financial resources, his ability
to pay restitution in installments, the rehabilitative effect of restitution, and other
circumstances militating against restitution. However, this report was never made part
of the record on appeal.

3

Labrum is currently under review in the Utah Supreme Court on this issue. The case was
argued and submitted on 4 October 1995.
13

The appellate record also contains no transcription of die sentencing hearing.
Defendant, defense counsel, and prosecutor all appeared at a sentencing hearing on 31
May 1995 (R. 23, 26-27). Restitution was apparently discussed; the signed minute
entry reports, "Restitution in this matter remains to be determined" and a restitution
hearing was set (R. 26). The sentencing hearing was reported by video (see R. 27).
However, no transcript or videotape is included in die record on appeal.
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant to
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to any finding or conclusion
appellant claims is unsupported by or is contrary to die evidence. "In essence, Rule 11
directs counsel to provide tiiis Court widi all evidence relevant to die issues raised on
appeal." Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002, cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah
App. 1989). Accord State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); State v.
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983);
Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). Absent an adequate record on
appeal, die reviewing court will of necessity assume die regularity of die proceedings
below. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S.
1033 (1990); State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988); State v. Theison, 709
P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995),
cert, denied,

P.2d

(Utah Feb. 6, 1996); Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d
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1049, 1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). It should do so
here.
* * *

Defendant's claim that the trial court failed to consider all statutory factors and
record its reasons for imposing restitution was not preserved in the trial court. In
addition, due to critical omissions in the record on appeal, this Court lacks the facts
necessary to test defendant's claim on appeal. The claim is thus doubly waived.
POINT H
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION OR FIND A
FACT AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BY
ACCEPTING THE VICTIM'S CALCULATION OF HIS LOSS AND
REJECTING DEFENDANT'S LOWER ESTIMATE
The prime issue in the restitution hearing was the amount of the victim's loss.
Richard Wright estimated his net loss at $21,576.50 (R. 28).4 Defendant estimated the
loss at $1,500 to $2,000 (R. 102). The trial court found a net loss of $20,156.50 (R.
37).5 Defendant now claims "that the trial court abused its discretion in determining
the amount of restitution to be paid." Br. of Aplt. at 10.

4

Wright estimated his total loss at $36,976.50, of which $15,400 was recovered
(R. 28).
5

The trial court accepted the victim's estimates, except that it subtracted out the
value of two handguns and some rolled coins that the State did not show "were not
already removed at the time of this burglary" (R. 37).
15

"Unless a trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its
discretion, [this Court] will not disturb its order of restitution." State v. Twitchell, 832
P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). This abuse-of-discretion standard
is appropriate in reviewing "rulings requiring a balancing of factors." State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n. 11 (Utah 1993).
However, defendant here challenges, not the trial court's balancing of factors, but
its findings of pure or historical fact. "Findings of pure fact are uniquely within the
province of the trial court and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." State v.
Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36
(Utah 1994). This standard is even more deferential than the "abuse of discretion"
standard. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270 n. 11.
An appellate court will "reverse a trial court's findings of fact only if they are
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. In
making such a determination, [the court will] view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court's findings." State v. One 1984 Oldsmobile, 892 P.2d 1042,
1043 (Utah 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, they are supported, not
opposed, by the clear weight of evidence.
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No Utah case law specifies the precision with which pecuniary damages must be
proven in the restitution context. However, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(c) (1995)
defines "pecuniary damages" as "all special damages, but not general damages, which
a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities . . ."
The civil standard does not require that the amount of damages be proven with
precision, but permits reasonable estimates. The standard requires only "evidence that
rises above speculation and provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise,
estimate of damages. * Atkin, Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph, 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). "[Although damages may not be
determined by speculation or guesswork, evidence allowing a just and reasonable
estimate of the damage based on relevant data is sufficient." Price-Orem Inv . Co. v.
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting
National Steel Corp. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 51A F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1978)).
Here, Wright's estimates were reasonable. His estimate that there were 45 one
hundred dollar bills in the stack defendant stole was based on a note he had placed with
the bills as well as the height of the stack (see R. 29, addendum B; 55-56). His
estimate of the $16,400 in the money box was based on a note specifying the numbers
and denominations of stolen bills (see R. 29, addendum B; R. 58-59). Wright was able
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to list the missing antique coins with specificity (R. 29, addendum B; R. 63), and relied
on estimates by a coin dealer, who separately estimated each coin based on its
denomination and year (R. 84-85). The only general estimate was the $800 that Wright
estimated was taken from two No. 10 coffee cans (R. 57-58). Moreover, Wright
testified that his estimates were conservative (R. 67).
Defendant's competing estimate was, in contrast, vague and conclusory. He
testified that he and his co-perpetrator counted "[j]ust the cash, the coins were not
counted" (R. 101). He claimed that they "arrived at a little bit over $16,000" (id.).
Unlike Wright, defendant specified no denominations and no numbers of bills; he
completely ignored the investment value of collectible gold coins; and he had no written
notes of the values he claimed. Defendant offered nothing more than his self-serving,
untestable, unilateral claim that "[w]e arrived at a little bit over $16,000."
At bottom, defendant's argument "is nothing but an attempt to have this Court
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on the contested factual issue."
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). This it cannot do.
"Determinations of witness credibility are the province of the trial court, and entitled to
deference." Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied,
878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994).
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The trial Court here did nothing more than resolve a credibility contest against
defendant. "It is elementary that a judge is not bound to believe one witness's
testimony to the total exclusion of that of another witness. When acting as the trier of
fact, the trial judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever weight he or she
deems appropriate." Newmeyer 745 P.2d at 1278. This is especially so where, as
here, defendant's estimates were vague and conclusory and the victim's estimates were
specific and tied to contemporaneous writings.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's restitution order should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION
Oral argument would not materially aid the decisional process in this case. A
published opinion would be helpful by further defining the law relating to the
calculation of pecuniary damages in the restitution context.
RESPECTFULLY submitted o n ^ j j a f e h 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

REDERIC VOROS, JR.
istant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

TS THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CASENO951400281

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

DATE: June 8, 1995

vs.

RESTITUTION ORDER
GUY R. BURNINGHAM, JUDGE

JEREMY S. OLSEN,
Defendant.

Cleric ZDupass

RESTITUTION ORDER
This matter came before the court for hearing on restitution with Claudia Laycock,
Deputy County Attorney, appearing for the Plaintiff. The defendant was present and
represented by Michael Jewell. The court heard testimony of witnesses, received exhibits
and heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises finds and orders
as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds by credible evidence, the State has sustained the burden of proving
the following items of restitution:
1. One broken window in the amount of

$306.00

2. Wallet with forty five $100.00 bills

4500.00

3. One bank bag of antique coins valued at

13,550.50

4. Money missing from the "money box"

16,400.00

5. Two #10 coffee cans with cash and change

800.00

000

The State has not shown that the two handguns which mysteriously disappeared
were taken in this burglary, nor that the "ammo box" amounts were not already removed at
the time of this burglary.
THEREFORE, the victim in this case is entitled to total restitution in the amount
of $35,556.50, less the amount recovered of $15,400.00, for a total balance of $20,156.50,
still unpaid.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant's probation conditions include the
payment of restitution in the amount of $20,156.50.

Dated this 8th day of June, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

cc: Claudia Laycock, Esq.
Michael Jewell, Esq.
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The antique coin collection stolen was not itemized completely. The following estimates are
based on conservative figures. The actual value of the collection, if it were to be replaced, would
probably cost 2 to 4 times the values listed here. Due to the amount of time required to make this
kind of estimate, I have chosen to not provide that at this time.
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Coins
$20
S20
$1
SI
.500
250
.100

Description
Conservative cost estimate (eachl Cost estimate (total)
$ 525.00
$20 gold coin 1910x1
$525.00
$20 gold coin 1911x1
$625.00
$ 625.00
$1 silver coins « Pre 1900s x 32
$100.00
$3,200.00
$1 silver coins « Post 1900s x 73
$25.00
$1,825.00
500 silver coins « 1940s x 106
$7.50
$ 795.00
250 silver coins * 1940s x 600
$5.00
$3,000.00
100 silver coins * 1940s x 1,023
$3.50
$3,580.50
$13,550.50
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YOUTH'S POSSIBLE CONSf

.F

iNCES

Fines, work hours, payment to victims, probation,
confinement, suspension of drivers license, and
counseling.

WHAT YOU NEED TO DO AND KNOW
* Check with police to see if stolen items are
recovered and/or damaged.
* If you have suffered a loss or damage, fill out
and return to us within two weeks the "Victim's
Itemized Statement" below.
* Attach copies of estimates and receipts
(the police DO NOT forward this information
to the Court).
* Fill out the "Victim Impact Statement" Mark
if you wish to be notified of all future court
hearings and/or the results of such hearings.
* Please refer to the case number below on all
communications with the court

V

<&>ifb

T TO VICTIMS

* Youth under 16 met/ work off $100 of restitution
a month in the Court-supervised work program.
($100,000 a year is paid to victims of juvenile
crime in Utah County through this program).
* Youth seldom pay restitution on the day it is
ordered in court
* Youth pays the court, the court pays the victim.
* Multiple victims of the same youth(s) are paid
in order of court appearance date.
* If your address changes, please inform the court
VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME
\ If you are the victim of sexual abuse, contact
ihe Children's Justice Center at 370-8554.
* If you have suffered serious physical injury you
may be eligible for help from the State Office of
Crime Victim Reparations at 1-800-621-7444.

Crime date / ^ - f f i f c a s e no. 24St)lf
/Y$>
Court ctflcerih
officer Y) 13V&OJ r\ Extension IJ13&
DETACH HERE • Return the lower portion to the Juvenne Court, keep the above portionforyour reference.

- - - - - - -

VICTIM'S ITEMIZED STATEMENT OF LOSS AND/OR DAMAGE
Case no.
\klJGH\l
Court officer *J>~&rTDLur~i

Are you claiming a loss and/or damage on this incident? (ves/noVM^

___Tel#r?Tf-7^/

DO YOU HAVE INSURANCE? (y/n) H _ Insurance Co.a4/lkfe6fr
Aoent Mcu, TZf?Jnall
Claim # _ Q i Z £ l i i ± ]

Deductible $

Sroote

If you have insurance the court will order the child to reimburse you for the deductible only. This Court
cannot consider claims for your own labor, pain and suffering, or time lost. These items may be pursued
through a civil court.
Value/Damage
3o6.to
H. TOOL OB

ITEM and/or DAMAGE SUFFERED:
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ATTACH COPIES OF ALL ESTIMATES AND RECEIPTS

TOTAL LOSS/DAMAGE: $3h*?Bki

ST?

I have checked with the Police Department and the items above have not been recovered, or if reco^eisa^
are damaged. I certify that my loss as represented herewith is true and correct to the best^oftn^nowjedge
and I understand that any fraudulent claim may subject me to criminal penalties.
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ADDENDUM C

FILED

Fourth JudlcW District Court
of Utah County, Stat* ot Utah

CARMAN SWIITH^Cterk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MCB0F1MED

Q
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MINUTE ENTRY - JUDGMENT
AND ORDER OF PROBATION

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 951400281
vs.

|

JEREMY S OLSEN

DATE: May 31, 1995
JUDGE: GUY R BURNINGHAM

Defendant.

REP. VIDEO
CLERK: LLP

This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of judgment on the abovenamed defendant on the charge(s) of:

Count 1, Buiglaiy, 3rd degree felony and Count 2,

Theft, 3rd degree felony. Deputy County Attorney James Taylor appeared for and on behalf
of the State of Utah. The defendant was present. Appearing for the defendant was Michael
Jewell.
On April 19, 1995, the defendant entered a plea of Guilty to the above-named
crime(s) and the matter was referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department for a
presentence investigation and report. The report has now been received and considered by the
Court. Counsel has been made aware of the recommendation.
There being no legal reason having been shown why sentence should not be
pronounced, it the judgment of the Court that the defendant be sentenced on Count 1 to the
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate period not to exceed five years and on Count 2 to the
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate period not to exceed five years.
ordered to pay on Count 1 a fine of $500 and a surcharge of $425.
1 and Count 2 may run concurrent

Defendant is

The sentences on Count

Execution of the sentence is suspended and the

defendant is placed on probation for a period of 36 months upon the following terms and
conditions:

000
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1.

Defendant is ordered to enter into an agreement with the Adult Probation and Parole
Department and comply strictly with the terms of probation.

2.

Defendant is ordered to make himself/herself available to the Adult Probation and Parole
and to the Court when requested to do so.

3.

Defendant is ordered to not violate the laws of the United States, the State of Utah, the
laws of any state or any municipality.

4.

Defendant is ordered on Count 1 to serve 30 days in the Utah County Jail and on Count
2 to serve 30 days in the Utah County Jail with school, work search and work release.
The jail sentences to run consecutive.

5.

Defendant is ordered to pay a fine of $500 or serve 100 hours of alternative community
service within six months of his release from the County Jail.

6.

Defendant is ordered to pay a surcharge of $425.

7.

Defendant is ordered to pay a monthy supervision fee of $30.

8.

Defendant is ordered to report to the Utah County Jail on June 7, 1995 between the
hours of 7:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. to begin serving the jail sentence. If the Jail cannot
accept the Defendant on this date, they will give the Defendant a date certain to report.

Restutition in this matter remains to be determined. This matter has been set for a
Resititution Hearing on June 8, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.
The Court retains jurisdiction to make further orders as necessary.
Dated this 31st day of May, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

000

cc:

Utah County Attorney
Michael Jewell
Adult Probation and Parole
Utah County Jail
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